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Sequelae of Recent Hospital Tort Liability
Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, Revisited
R. Crawford Morris*

ON

JuLY 18, 1956, the Supreme Court of Ohio handed down
its decision in the case of Avellone v. St. John's Hospital,1
reversing nearly fifty years of Ohio law 2 and repudiating the
limited immunity doctrine as it had heretofore existed. Syllabus
of the decision, which, under Ohio law, alone constitutes the
holding of the Court, reads as follows:
"1. A corporation not for profit, which has as its purpose
the maintenance and operation of a hospital, is, under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, liable for the torts of its
servants. (Taylor, Admr. v. Protestant Hospital Assn., 85
Ohio St., 90, Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115 Ohio St., 539,
and paragraphs one and two of the syllabus of Lakeside
Hospital v. Kovar, Admr., 131 Ohio St., 333, overruled.)
2. In an action to recover damages for injury to a patient alleged to have been caused by the negligence of a nonprofit hospital, an answer fied by the defendant, which alleges that it is a corporation not for profit maintaining and
operating a public charitable hospital, does not state a defense and is subject to demurrer."
This monumental decision raises two questions of extreme
importance which seem to be left unanswered and which will
unquestionably be the subject of further litigation. Those questions are:
1. Is the scope of the Avellone decision limited solely to
hospitals or are all charities deprived of immunity?
2. Has Ohio adopted the New York Rule?
* Member of the firm of Arter, Hadden, Wykoff & Van Duzer of Cleveland,
Ohio. Formal education at Princeton University, Harvard Law School, Yale
University, Harvard Graduate School of Engineering, Mass, Inst. of Technology. Lecturer at the Graduate School of Nursing and Hospital Administration of Western Reserve University and University Hospitals of Cleveland, St. Luke's Hospital, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland Clinical Society; etc.
Defense counsel in the Avellone v. St. John's Hospital case.
1 165 0. S. 467; 135 N. E. 2d 410 (1956); discussed in, Jacobson, Hospital
Tort Liability, 5 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 118 (1956).
2 Taylor v. Protestant Hospital, 85 0. S. 90; 96 N. E. 1089 (1911), to Avellone
v. St. John's Hospital (1956), ibid., n. 1.
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Charities Other Than Hospitals
For nearly fifty years3 Ohio granted to all charities and organizations such as the Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts, Y. M. C. A.'s,
and the like, a limited immunity as a matter of public policy,
holding them liable to beneficiaries of the charity only for negligence in selecting or retaining their servants, but holding them
immune from liability to such persons for the negligent acts of
those servants. In presentation of the Avellone case to the
Supreme Court, both in brief and in oral argument, it was made
clear that the Ohio immunity rule applied to all charities and
that any decision in the case at bar would logically extend to
affect all charities alike, many of which are small, struggling organizations with very limited budgets.
More specifically, the recent experience of the State of
Washington, wherein its Supreme Court found itself forced to
retreat from its repudiation of the rule insofar as charities other
than hospitals were concerned, was called to the attention of
the Court as a reason for retaining the rather limited immunity
in favor of all charities rather than to attempt to repudiate it
insofar as the instant defendant, a hospital, was concerned, with
the resultant loss of immunity for all other charities. Washington's experience was this:
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Association
(Supreme Court of Washington, Sept. 1, 1953)4 involved a suit
by a paying patient against a charitable nonprofit hospital, for
personal injuries allegedly sustained by reason of the negligence
of a nurse in injecting a foreign substance into plaintiff's left
arm, causing pain and permanent injury. Defendant's demurrer
to the complaint on the ground of the charitable immunity of
that State was sustained by the trial court. Plaintiff declined
to plead further and an order dismissing the action with prejudice was accordingly entered. Plaintiff then appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in a 6 to 3 decision, reversed and remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer,
holding that a charitable nonprofit hospital should no longer be
held immune from liability for injuries to paying patients caused
by the negligence of employees of the hospital, overruling all
previous decisions to the contrary. While the actual holding of
the Court was, of course, limited to the case of the hospital
s Ibid., n. 2.
4

43 Wash. 2d 162; 260 P. 2d 765 (1953).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol6/iss1/6

2

HOSPITAL TORT LIABILITY

charity before it, the language of the majority opinion makes it
clear that the Court was aware that its decision could not be
restricted to hospitals but would affect, as a matter of sheer
logic, all charities. Said the majority in their opinion: 5
"Nor do we overlook the fact that the principles with which
we are dealing have application also to such organizations
as Y. M. C. A.'s, Y. W. C. A.'s and Red Cross. Such organizations have benefited much less than hospitals from changed
economic conditions and social outlook.
"The public policy with which we are here concerned,
however, must be based upon general conditions and the
average situation. It cannot be designed to meet special
cases or deal with particular instances of hardship."
One of the three dissenting judges remarked: 6
"But regardless of the origin of the error, the majority
opinion bases its present determination to abandon our longestablished policy upon the proposition that private charity
has been displaced by a paternalistic government which will
furnish free charitable services (as long as the taxpayers
are financially able) and that hospitals, Y. M. C. A.'s, Boy
Scouts, Red Cross chapters and other similar organizations
do not any longer need encouragement. In my opinion, this
proposition is without any factual support in this state at
the present time.
"Charity is still a virtue and is entitled to the same encouragement that it has always received at the hands of
this court.
"'When we consider the great diversity of variant rules
which might be adopted, and at the same time remember
that the rule with which we are dealing does not apply to
hospitals alone but to churches, educational institutions,
Y. M. C. A.'s, social welfare organizations, and, in general,
to the various organizations engaged in philanthropic, benevolent and charitable work, it is at once manifest that a
change in the rule, particularly its complete abandonment,
would have far-reaching, and, perhaps, unimagined and
unintended consequences ... '
The dissent's warning was sound. Mother Carey's chickens
came home to roost in Darrol Lee Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical
Free Church (Supreme Ct. of Wash., Aug. 18, 1955, Rehearing
Denied Sept. 28, 1955) .7 Here plaintiff was an injured child,
but the defendant, instead of being a large charitable hospital,
5 Ibid at p. 770.
6
7

lbid at pp. 776-777.
47 Wash. 2d 202; 287 P. 2d 128 (1955).
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was a small charitable church. In order to get children to and
from the Sunday School, the President of the congregation and
one of the founders of the Church, himself drove the Church
bus every Sunday. On one occasion he so operated the bus that
a log came through the window, severely injuring the plaintiff,
an eleven-year-old boy. The trial court dismissed the action on
two grounds: First, that the plaintiff could not maintain an
action in tort against the defendant charitable nonprofit corporation, and second, that there was failure of proof of negligence
on the part of the President. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme
Court, arguing that the trial court's holding was in violation
of Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Association,
supra. The Supreme Court of Washington protected the Tumwater Evangelical Free Church by throwing about it the cloak
of charitable immunity. In doing so it did not seem bothered in
the least by its recent decision in the Pierce case, but readily
distinguished that decision and limited it to the specific instance
of a paying patient plaintiff and of a charitable hospital defendant. Notwithstanding the broad language in both the majority
and dissenting opinions contained in the Pierce case decision
concerning all charities, in affirming the trial court's judgment in
favor of Tumwater Evangelical Free Church, the same Supreme
Court said:"
"Appellant contends that the rule of charitable immunity
has been rejected by the Pierce case, and that therefore the
doctrine of respondeat superior applies to ecclesiastical
bodies. That case did not reject the rule of charitable immunity, but merely modified it. There was only one question before us in the Pierce case, and it was stated in the
first paragraph thereof: 'Where a paying patient of a charitable, nonprofit hospital sustains injuries by reason of the
negligence of a nurse, may such patient recover damages
from the hospital?' We held that such an institution 'should
no longer be held immune from liability for injuries to paying patients caused by the negligence of employees of the
hospital.' We do not wish to extend the above holding to
apply to a nonprofit, religious organization which transports
children, without charge, to and from Sunday school in order
that they may receive a spiritual education and eventually
become members of a church organization."
While it is possible to distinguish the two cases on the
grounds that the plaintiff in the Pierce case was a paying patient,
whereas no charge was made to the Sunday School children for
8 Ibid at pp. 129-130.
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the bus transportation to and from Sunday School, this would
seem to be a distinction without a difference: first, because no
patient in a hospital is a fully paying patient, but is partly or
quasi paying; 9 and second, because while the record is silent on
this point, the probability is that Darrol Lee Lyon, like most
Sunday School children, probably dropped his pennies in the
plate each Sunday and thus in a sense paid partially for the
spiritual education he was receiving. The only other distinction
remaining is that the defendant in the Pierce case was a hospital, whereas the defendant in the Lyon case was a church. But
this also seems to be a distinction without a difference, both
being corporations, both being not for profit, and both being
charitable in their purpose. Logically we can see no distinction
between these two cases beyond the fact that the Supreme Court
of Washington desired, as a matter of public policy of its own, to
remove the immunity from hospitals but to retain it for smaller
charities. This would seem to be a problem for the legislature
and not properly for the court.
What then is the scope of the Avellone decision? When one
is aware that the dilemma of the Supreme Court of Washington,
as represented by the above two cases, was specifically called to
the Court's attention with a warning that any decision in the
Avellone case concerning the defendant hospital would apply
equally to all charities, large and small alike, an interesting fact
concerning the Avellone decision emerges. Both in the syllabus
and in the majority opinion the Court has been painstakingly
careful to limit its language to the single instance of a charitable
hospital. The syllabus itself mentions only "a corporation not
for profit which has as its purpose the maintenance and operation of a hospital." The majority opinion nowhere mentions,
with the exception of quotations from other cases, any charity
other than a hospital, and further contains this express statement: 10
"The present case has to do only with the pleadings and
does not extend beyond the question of the liability of a
hospital for the negligence of those employees who can and
do make the hospital answerable for their actions under the
doctrine of respondeatsuperior."
For every dollar the patient pays, the hospital spends several dollars out
of its general endowment fund to cover the cost of the care provided.
10 165 0. S., at p. 478 (1956).
9
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However, the dissenting opinion warns the majority: 11
"Although the instant case involves the liability of a
charitable hospital, it can be seen from the above quotation
that the same rule applies to all public charitable institutions.
The defendant in its brief lists about one hundred charitable
activities in Cleveland alone which participate financially in
the Welfare Federation of Cleveland.... All these are vitally
affected by this decision. It cannot logically be circumscribed to be applicable to hospitals alone."
It seems unmistakably clear that the intention, and expressed holding embodying that intention, of the majority of
the Court, limits the scope of the Avellone decision solely to
charitable hospitals. Confirmation of this requires further litigation, which we are informed 12 has already presented itself, a
demurrer having been filed to the separate charitable defense set
up by a defendant charity which is not a hospital, presently
pending a ruling before a trial court of this State. It remains but
for that case to find its way to our Supreme Court, to force clarification of the Avellone decision in this regard, just as the Turnwater case did in the State of Washington. It is the opinion of
this writer that our Supreme Court meant to and will continue
by future decision to limit the scope of the Avellone decision
to the sole instance of charitable hospitals.
The New York Rule
The majority opinion in the Avellone decision, in reaching
its conclusion, stated: 13
"We, thus, conclude that a corporation not for profit, which
has as its purpose the maintenance and operation of a hospital, is, under the doctrine of respondeat superior (and the
various rules and exceptions applicable thereto), liable for
the torts of its servants,

. .

4

and then went on to say: '
"and leave for future determination the application of this
doctrine to the facts of the instant case as may be proved
on trial. For instance, we are not deciding that persons
working in a hospital, such as doctors and nurses, under
circumstances where the hospital has no authority or right
of control over them, can bind the hospital by their negli11 165 0. S. 479 (1956).

At a lecture of this writer to the Annual Meeting of the Common Pleas
Judges' Association in Columbus, Ohio on December 7, 1956, one trial judge
12

so reported to this writer.
13 165 0. S. 477 (1956).
14

165 0. S. 477-478 (1956).
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gent actions. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y., 125, 105 N. E. 92, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.), 505."
When this language is considered in the light of the briefs
and oral arguments presented to the Supreme Court, the question arises as to whether or not Ohio has adopted the New York
rule, and if it has, just what this will mean in terms of future
litigation.
In its numerous decisions upholding the doctrine of charitable immunity over its nearly fifty year period of existence,
the Supreme Court of Ohio had based its reasoning upon the
fact that charities are "masters different from others." 15 The
difference lies in the fact that the fundamental basis on which
rests the harsh doctrine of respondeat superior, which imposes
upon one the responsibility for the acts of another, is the right
to control the details of the manner and method of the work
performed. In the case of charities and especially of hospitals,
such right to control is considerably diminished by the fact that
the servant is either a volunteer worker or a professional person
tuch as a nurse or intern who, as a practical matter, is more apt
to follow her own theories and training in carrying out her
professional duties, or else to obey the exacting orders of the
doctor in charge of the case, than the routine orders of the hospital. In an age of specialization, with the necessity of increasing
reliance upon independent experts, the reason for the rule
seems more valid than ever before. All of this was carefully
presented to the Court, with the appeal that the immunity should
be retained.
However, there was a danger inherent in such an argument
which was foreseen and also presented to the Supreme Court.
That danger was that a compromise be effected whereby the
charity be granted immunity for those acts of its servants over
which it did not have as a practical matter the full right of control possessed by a normal employer, but that it be held liable
for all acts of its servants where it possessed such full right of
control. In the case of the hospital this would mean that any
act of a nurse which was not a carrying out of her professional
duties, but was merely a routine administrative act, would
15 Taylor v. Protestant Hospital, 85 0. S. 90 at p. 102, 96 N. E. 1089 (1911)*
Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital, 104 0. S. 61. 135 N. E. 281
(1922); Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115 0. S. 539, 155 N. F. 126 (1926);
Sisters of Charity v. Durelius, 123 0. S. 52, 173 N. E. 737 (1930); Lakeside
Hospital v. Kovar, 131 0. S. 333, 2 N. E. 2d 857 (1936); Waddell v. YWCA,
133 0. S. 601, 15 N. E. 2d 140 (1938); Cullen v. Schmidt, 139 0. S. 194, 39
N. E. 2d 148 (1942).
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render the hospital liable if negligently performed, but that any
act in the performance of her professional duties would not
render the hospital liable, no matter how negligently performed.
This is the New York rule.' While logically *appealing as a
workable compromise, it has proved in fact to be extremely illogical, unworkable, and to lead to an enormous amount of litigation benefiting no one but the legal profession, and adding to
the ever-growing volume of litigation clogging our court dockets.
The New York rule sprang from Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hospital, supraY' That case involved a paying patient's suit against a charitable hospital for a claimed technical
assault and battery in the nature of an operation without consent. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant hospital, which was affirmed by the Appellate Division, and also by
the Court of Appeals, Judge Cardozo writing the opinion. In that
opinion Judge Cardozo, in holding that any knowledge on the
part of the nurse concerning plaintiff's instructions authorizing
the performance of an examination under ether, to ascertain the
character of her tumor, but forbidding any operation to remove
the tumor, did not charge the hospital with notice that the surgeons were operating without the patient's consent, took occasion to say: I
"The conclusion therefore follows that the trial judge did not
err in his direction of a verdict.
"... Nurses-in treating a patient . . . are not acting as the
servants of the hospital .. . but . . . are employed to carry

out the orders of the physicians to whose authority they are
subject. The hospital undertakes to procure for the patient
the services of a nurse. It does not undertake, through the
agency of nurses, to render those services itself ....

If there

are duties performed by nurses foreign to their duties in
carrying out the physicians orders, and having relation to
the administrative conduct of the hospital, the fact is not
established by this record, nor was it in the discharge of
such duties that the defendant nurses were then serving.
...The acts of preparation immediately preceding the operation ...

are really part of the operation itself."

From this language the New York rule arose, which simply
is that a hospital 9 is not liable for those acts of its servants
16 SchloendorfF v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E.
92 (1914); See 25 A. L. 19. 2d 29 at p. 170.
17 211 N. Y. 125; 105 N. ] . 92 (1914).
18 bid at p. 94.
19 It seems unsettled in New York whether or not the New York rule applies to hospitals for profit as well as to charitable hospitals, the inference
being that it applies to both alike. See 25 A. L. R. 2d 29 at pp. 170-173.
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deemed to be "professional" acts, i.e. those involved in carrying
out the professional duties of treating the patient, but is liable
for those acts deemed "administrative" acts, i.e., in carrying out
routine, purely administrative duties (where negligently performed). The impracticality of this apparently logical rule can
be seen by the sad history of just one of the innumerable cases
created by the rule.
In Berg v. New York Society, 20 plaintiff entered defendant's
hospital for treatment of rheumatoid arthritis, treatment consisting in part of blood transfusions, which required that plaintiff's blood be determined, including its R. H. factor. A blood
sample was taken from plaintiff, and the necessary test was
performed by the laboratory technician employed in the hospital's laboratory. it was mistakenly reported that plaintiff's
blood was type A-R. I. positive, whereas in fact her blood was
type A-R. H. negative. In reliance on this report R. H. positive
blood was transfused into plaintiff, which caused her injury in
the nature of a still-born child. The trial court held that the
mistake was not a professional act but an administrative act for
which the hospital was liable. The Appellate Division2 1 reversed
the trial court, holding that the act was a professional act, not
an administrative act for which the hospital could not be liable.
There was a vigorous dissenting opinion, 22 claiming that the act
was administrative and not professional. In its opinion the
3

majority stated: 2

"Of course, the realities of hospital procedure are not
polarized into 'medical' and 'administrative' acts. It may be
presumed that almost all acts which a hospital performs for
its patients inevitably relate in some degree to the medical
care and treatment of those patients. The determination of
whether any one such act is 'medical' or 'administrative'
often hinges on blending borderline considerations which,
as may be supposed, invite delicate distinctions for the reconciliation of some of the decisions, e.g., compare Volk v.
City of New York, 284 N. Y. 279, 284-285, 30 N. E. 2d, 596,
597, 598, with Steinert v. Brunswick Home, Inc., supra.
"Such a highly refined line of distinction may suggest
reappraisal of the underlying rationale, perhaps through
legislative action."
20
21
22
23

136 N. Y. S. 2d 528 (1954).
146 N. Y. S. 2d 548 (1955).
Ibid at pp. 551-552.
Ibid at p. 551.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1957

9

CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW

However, the Court of Appeals again reversed this case, 24
holding that the act was an administrative and not a professional
act for which the hospital was liable. In its opinion the court
said: 25
"Without reviewing or revising the whole Schloendorff
v. Society of New York Hosp. rule (1914, 211 N. Y. 125, 105
N. E. 92, 52 L. R. A., N. S., 505), and without determining
whether the rule itself has outlived its usefulness, we hold
that this particular hospital as the employer of this particular
young woman is liable for her negligence.
"Whatever be the ultimate fate of the Schloendorff rule,
this case need not be pushed into the Schloendorff mold."
The Berg case clearly shows the vice of the New York rule
and the confusion and despair that it has caused the New York
courts. That vice is simply this: In order to determine whether
or not immunity or liability (if negligence is proved) is to be
the rule of a particular case, that case must be litigated so that
its own particular set of facts may be analyzed and ruled "professional" or "administrative." The borderline distinctions are
so refined that there is virtually no 'agreement in the courts,
which leads to the twin evils of (1) multiplicity of litigation and
(2) uncertainty and chaos in the law, perhaps the greatest
social evil of all.26 The situation is so severe that the New York

courts are crying out against the Schloendorff rule and begging
for legislative action to correct it.
All of this27 was brought to the attention of our Supreme
Court during oral argument of the Avellone case, with an urgent
appeal that Ohio not adopt the New York rule with its confusing
borderline refinements. 28 Notwithstanding all of this, the lan154 N. Y. S. 2d 455; 1 N. Y. 2d 499; 136 N. E. 2d 523 (decided July 11,
1956).
25 Ibid at pp. 456-457.
26 As our Supreme Court said in City of Youngstown v. Fishel, 89 0. S. 247
at p. 252; 104 N. E. 141 (1914):
"The doctrine of precedents owes its origin and observance to a
recognition of the necessity for stability and uniformity in the construction and interpretation of the law, and no argument is necessary to
support the view that the administration of justice calls for well-settled
rules in such matters .......
27 With the exception of the Court of Appeals decision (1 N. Y. 2d 499)"
which was rendered after oral argument and shortly before the announcement of the Avellone decision. See also Cadicamo v. Long Island College
Hospital, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 287 (1953), affirmed in 130 N. Y. S. 2d 889 (1954),
but reversed in 124 N. E. 2d 279 (1954).
28 For further refinement of the New York rule see the recent decision of
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Swigerd v. City of Ortenville, 75 N. W.
2d 217 (1956), where the court held:
24
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guage of the majority opinion in the Avellone case 20 leaves little
doubt in the writer's mind that our Supreme Court meant to
and will in the future adopt and apply the New York rule, although this serious problem is also left to future determination
by further litigation.
Conclusion
Without consideration of the merits of retaining the charitable immunity doctrine as it had existed in Ohio for nearly
fifty years, up to the Avellone decision, 30 it is clear that our
Supreme Court in repudiating the immunity doctrine has created
two serious problems which can be resolved only by further
litigation, and one of which may well lead Ohio into a chaos of
legal confusion and a morass of multiplicity of litigation, until
ultimately our courts will cry out, as the New York courts have
done, for our legislature to come to the rescue and save us from
this monster of judicial creation-the New York rule.
(Continued from preceding page.)
"We adopt the rule that the hospital is liable for the negligence of

its nurses in performing mere administrative or clinical acts which acts
though constituting a part of the patient's prescribed medical treatment
do not require the application of the specialized technique or the understanding of a skilled physician or surgeon."
29 See footnote 13, supra.
30 The doctrine of stare decisis alone would seem to require retention of
this doctrine by the courts. If public policy did require its abolition, that
would seem to be a matter for the legislature, which is best equipped to
examine the problems of all charities and to formulate our public policy
thereon without the devastating result of the retroactive effect of judicial
decision. [The writer.]
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